16 ideas
20350 | Metaphysics generalises the data, to get at the ontology [Richardson] |
20349 | Metaphysics aims at the essence of things, and a system to show how this explains other truths [Richardson] |
20351 | Metaphysics needs systems, because analysis just obsesses over details [Richardson] |
3425 | Reduction has been defined as deriving one theory from another by logic and maths [Nagel,E, by Kim] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
20356 | Humans dominate because, unlike other animals, they have a synthesis of conflicting drives [Richardson] |
20366 | A mind that could see cause and effect as a continuum would deny cause and effect [Richardson] |