15 ideas
| 8044 | Goffman sees the self as no more than a peg on which to hang roles we play [Goffman, by MacIntyre] |
| 22480 | Possessing the virtue of justice disposes a person to good practical rationality [Foot] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 22477 | Calling a knife or farmer or speech or root good does not involve attitudes or feelings [Foot] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 22478 | The essential thing is the 'needs' of plants and animals, and their operative parts [Foot] |
| 22479 | Observing justice is necessary to humans, like hunting to wolves or dancing to bees [Foot] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |