Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'Possible Worlds and Necessary A Posteriori' and 'Mathematics is Megethology'

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25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
10807 Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
10809 We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis]
10811 The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis]
10812 The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
10813 What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis]
10814 Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10806 Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
10816 We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
10808 Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
10815 We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10810 I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14633 How do we tell a table's being contingently plastic from its being essentially plastic? [Jackson]
14635 An x is essentially F if it is F in every possible world in which it appears [Jackson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14632 Quine may have conflated de re and de dicto essentialism, but there is a real epistemological problem [Jackson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
14631 How can you show the necessity of an a posteriori necessity, if it might turn out to be false? [Jackson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]