29 ideas
| 3123 | Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal] |
| 3125 | Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal] |
| 3105 | Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal] |
| 3106 | If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal] |
| 16861 | A false theory could hardly rival the explanatory power of natural selection [Darwin] |
| 3113 | The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal] |
| 3112 | Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal] |
| 3108 | If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal] |
| 3110 | Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal] |
| 3124 | Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal] |
| 3117 | Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal] |
| 3104 | Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal] |
| 3103 | Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal] |
| 3111 | Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal] |
| 3109 | If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal] |
| 3116 | Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal] |
| 3121 | If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal] |
| 3118 | If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal] |
| 3119 | Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |