Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'The soul's dependence on the body' and 'First-order Logic, 2nd-order, Completeness'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
23269 Philosophy must start from clearly observed facts [Galen]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
10751 Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg]
10757 Henkin semantics has a second domain of predicates and relations (in upper case) [Rossberg]
10759 There are at least seven possible systems of semantics for second-order logic [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
10753 Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
10752 Γ |- S says S can be deduced from Γ; Γ |= S says a good model for Γ makes S true [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
10754 In proof-theory, logical form is shown by the logical constants [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10756 A model is a domain, and an interpretation assigning objects, predicates, relations etc. [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
10758 If models of a mathematical theory are all isomorphic, it is 'categorical', with essentially one model [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
10761 Completeness can always be achieved by cunning model-design [Rossberg]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
10755 A deductive system is only incomplete with respect to a formal semantics [Rossberg]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
23266 The spirit in the soul wants freedom, power and honour [Galen]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
23219 Stopping the heart doesn't terminate activity; pressing the brain does that [Galen, by Cobb]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
23264 Philosophers think faculties are in substances, and invent a faculty for every activity [Galen]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
23220 The brain contains memory and reason, and is the source of sensation and decision [Galen]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
23265 The rational part of the soul is the desire for truth, understanding and recollection [Galen]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
23268 We execute irredeemable people, to protect ourselves, as a deterrent, and ending a bad life [Galen]