21 ideas
23269 | Philosophy must start from clearly observed facts [Galen] |
16186 | The Barcan Formulas express how to combine modal operators with classical quantifiers [Simchen] |
16187 | The Barcan Formulas are orthodox, but clash with the attractive Actualist view [Simchen] |
16190 | BF implies that if W possibly had a child, then something is possibly W's child [Simchen] |
16188 | Serious Actualism says there are no facts at all about something which doesn't exist [Simchen] |
23266 | The spirit in the soul wants freedom, power and honour [Galen] |
23219 | Stopping the heart doesn't terminate activity; pressing the brain does that [Galen, by Cobb] |
23264 | Philosophers think faculties are in substances, and invent a faculty for every activity [Galen] |
23220 | The brain contains memory and reason, and is the source of sensation and decision [Galen] |
23265 | The rational part of the soul is the desire for truth, understanding and recollection [Galen] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
23268 | We execute irredeemable people, to protect ourselves, as a deterrent, and ending a bad life [Galen] |