Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'Principles of Arithmetic, by a new method' and 'The Ultimate Constituents of Matter'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

24 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
7548 Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
13949 All models of Peano axioms are isomorphic, so the models all seem equally good for natural numbers [Cartwright,R on Peano]
18113 PA concerns any entities which satisfy the axioms [Peano, by Bostock]
17634 Peano axioms not only support arithmetic, but are also fairly obvious [Peano, by Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
15653 We can add Reflexion Principles to Peano Arithmetic, which assert its consistency or soundness [Halbach on Peano]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
17635 Arithmetic can have even simpler logical premises than the Peano Axioms [Russell on Peano]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
7545 Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
7553 Sense-data are purely physical [Russell]
7549 If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
7546 A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
7550 We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
7547 Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell]
7551 Matter is a logical construction [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
7552 Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell]