23 ideas
4424 | A warlike philosopher challenges problems to single combat [Nietzsche] |
13949 | All models of Peano axioms are isomorphic, so the models all seem equally good for natural numbers [Cartwright,R on Peano] |
18113 | PA concerns any entities which satisfy the axioms [Peano, by Bostock] |
17634 | Peano axioms not only support arithmetic, but are also fairly obvious [Peano, by Russell] |
15653 | We can add Reflexion Principles to Peano Arithmetic, which assert its consistency or soundness [Halbach on Peano] |
17635 | Arithmetic can have even simpler logical premises than the Peano Axioms [Russell on Peano] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
2886 | The distinction between egoistic and non-egoistic acts is absurd [Nietzsche] |
4426 | A bad result distorts one's judgement about the virtue of what one has done [Nietzsche] |
4425 | The overcoming of pity I count among the noble virtues [Nietzsche] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
20132 | To become what you are you must have no self-awareness [Nietzsche] |
20144 | Eternal recurrence is the highest attainable affirmation [Nietzsche] |
2889 | One repays a teacher badly if one remains only a pupil [Nietzsche] |
2887 | I am not an atheist because of reasoning or evidence, but because of instinct [Nietzsche] |