Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'Principles of Arithmetic, by a new method' and 'On the Ultimate Origination of Things'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
19336 Wisdom involves the desire to achieve perfection [Leibniz]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
13949 All models of Peano axioms are isomorphic, so the models all seem equally good for natural numbers [Cartwright,R on Peano]
18113 PA concerns any entities which satisfy the axioms [Peano, by Bostock]
17634 Peano axioms not only support arithmetic, but are also fairly obvious [Peano, by Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / g. Incompleteness of Arithmetic
15653 We can add Reflexion Principles to Peano Arithmetic, which assert its consistency or soundness [Halbach on Peano]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
17635 Arithmetic can have even simpler logical premises than the Peano Axioms [Russell on Peano]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
7696 Leibniz first asked 'why is there something rather than nothing?' [Leibniz, by Jacquette]
19341 There must be a straining towards existence in the essence of all possible things [Leibniz]
19428 Because something does exist, there must be a drive in possible things towards existence [Leibniz]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
5047 The world is physically necessary, as its contrary would imply imperfection or moral absurdity [Leibniz]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
19343 We follow the practical rule which always seeks maximum effect for minimum cost [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
19429 The principle of determination in things obtains the greatest effect with the least effort [Leibniz]