Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'The Nature and Communication of Substance' and 'An essentialist approach to Truth-making'

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15 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 5. Parallelism
Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks [Leibniz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
If the universe is a perfect agreement of uncommunicating substances, there must be a common source [Leibniz]