25 ideas
12780 | We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz] |
12774 | Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz] |
12777 | Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz] |
12782 | Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz] |
12778 | There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz] |
12783 | Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz] |
12775 | Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz] |
12776 | Every substance is alive [Leibniz] |
12753 | A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz] |
12781 | A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz] |
12779 | There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz] |
12785 | Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz] |
2596 | Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks [Leibniz] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
2595 | If the universe is a perfect agreement of uncommunicating substances, there must be a common source [Leibniz] |
12784 | Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz] |