20 ideas
| 16039 | Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K] |
| 16043 | Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K] |
| 16047 | Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K] |
| 16040 | Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K] |
| 16044 | Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K] |
| 16046 | Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K] |
| 16049 | Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K] |
| 16042 | The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K] |
| 2596 | Maybe mind and body are parallel, like two good clocks [Leibniz] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 2595 | If the universe is a perfect agreement of uncommunicating substances, there must be a common source [Leibniz] |