16 ideas
| 21677 | How can the not-true fail to be false, or the not-false fail to be true? [Cicero] |
| 12741 | If experience is just a dream, it is still real enough if critical reason is never deceived [Leibniz] |
| 12740 | The strongest criterion that phenomena show reality is success in prediction [Leibniz] |
| 12721 | Light, heat and colour are apparent qualities, and so are motion, figure and extension [Leibniz] |
| 21667 | Oratory and philosophy are closely allied; orators borrow from philosophy, and ornament it [Cicero] |
| 21678 | If desire is not in our power then neither are choices, so we should not be praised or punished [Cicero] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |