Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'On Probability and Induction' and 'On Plural Reference and Set Theory'

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12 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Contextual values are acceptable in research, but not in its final evaluation [Reichenbach, by Reiss/Sprenger]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
A 'singulariser' converts a plural like 'number of' to a syntactically neutral form [Cartwright,H, by Hossack]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]