18 ideas
| 17807 | To study formal systems, look at the whole thing, and not just how it is constructed in steps [Curry] |
| 17806 | It is untenable that mathematics is general physical truths, because it needs infinity [Curry] |
| 17808 | Saying mathematics is logic is merely replacing one undefined term by another [Curry] |
| 8851 | Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M] |
| 8849 | Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M] |
| 8853 | Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M] |
| 8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
| 8852 | In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |