Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'On the Conservation of Force' and 'Mr Strawson on Logical Theory'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
22438 Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with [Quine]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
22436 Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language [Quine]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
22431 Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
22435 The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then [Quine]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
22433 It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
22437 Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
22434 Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
22432 Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
22430 If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
20646 Helmholtz used 'energy' to mathematically link heat, light, electricity and magnetism [Helmholtz, by Watson]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
20973 All forces conserve the sum of kinetic and potential energy [Helmholtz, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
13713 Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider]