22 ideas
18543 | Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton] |
18542 | Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton] |
3460 | Superactors and superspartans count against behaviourism [Putnam, by Searle] |
18546 | The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton] |
18550 | Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton] |
18544 | Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton] |
18553 | Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton] |
18556 | Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton] |
18548 | Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton] |
18551 | Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
18541 | Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
18554 | Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton] |