14 ideas
8942 | Lukasiewicz's L3 logic has three truth-values, T, F and I (for 'indeterminate') [Lukasiewicz, by Fisher] |
21563 | The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell] |
21565 | Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell] |
21564 | Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |