19 ideas
23514 | The cerbellum has a huge number of neurons, but little involvement in consciousness [Seth] |
23513 | Single neurons can carry out complex functions [Seth] |
23516 | Maybe a system is conscious if the whole generates more information than its parts [Seth] |
23519 | The self is embodied, perspectival, volitional, narrative and social [Seth, by PG] |
8090 | Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin] |
23518 | Modern AI is mostly machine-based pattern recognition [Seth] |
11143 | If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence] |
23517 | Volition is felt as doing what you want, with possible alternatives, and a source from within [Seth] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
23515 | Human exceptionalism plagues biology, and most other human thinking [Seth] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |