38 ideas
| 19323 | 'Snow is white' depends on meaning; whether snow is white depends on snow [Etchemendy] |
| 19137 | We can get a substantive account of Tarski's truth by adding primitive 'true' to the object language [Etchemendy] |
| 12747 | Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz] |
| 12748 | Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz] |
| 13184 | The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz] |
| 13188 | The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz] |
| 12752 | Only unities have any reality [Leibniz] |
| 13187 | In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz] |
| 19383 | A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz] |
| 13179 | A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz] |
| 12749 | Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz] |
| 12722 | Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz] |
| 19379 | The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz] |
| 13182 | Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz] |
| 13178 | Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz] |
| 19411 | In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz] |
| 19412 | If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz] |
| 19410 | Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz] |
| 13183 | Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz] |
| 19409 | Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz] |
| 11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
| 13186 | Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 13185 | Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz] |
| 13177 | An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz] |
| 13093 | The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz] |
| 13096 | The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz] |
| 13180 | Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz] |
| 13181 | Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz] |