72 ideas
| 15413 | With four tense operators, all complex tenses reduce to fourteen basic cases [Burgess] |
| 15415 | The temporal Barcan formulas fix what exists, which seems absurd [Burgess] |
| 15430 | Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess] |
| 15431 | It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess] |
| 15429 | Relevance logic's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason' [Burgess] |
| 15404 | Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess] |
| 15405 | Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess] |
| 15427 | The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess] |
| 15421 | Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess] |
| 15403 | Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess] |
| 15407 | Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess] |
| 15424 | Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess] |
| 15409 | All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess] |
| 15414 | The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess] |
| 15406 | 'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess] |
| 15425 | The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess] |
| 15426 | We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess] |
| 15408 | 'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess] |
| 15418 | Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess] |
| 15412 | Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess] |
| 15411 | We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess] |
| 15416 | We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess] |
| 15428 | The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess] |
| 15420 | De re modality seems to apply to objects a concept intended for sentences [Burgess] |
| 15419 | General consensus is S5 for logical modality of validity, and S4 for proof [Burgess] |
| 15417 | Logical necessity has two sides - validity and demonstrability - which coincide in classical logic [Burgess] |
| 15422 | Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess] |
| 15423 | It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess] |
| 20043 | Evolutionary explanations look to the past or the group, not to the individual [Stout,R] |
| 20058 | Not all explanation is causal. We don't explain a painting's beauty, or the irrationality of root-2, that way [Stout,R] |
| 20035 | Philosophy of action studies the nature of agency, and of deliberate actions [Stout,R] |
| 20084 | Agency is causal processes that are sensitive to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20061 | Mental states and actions need to be separate, if one is to cause the other [Stout,R] |
| 20079 | Are actions bodily movements, or a sequence of intention-movement-result? [Stout,R] |
| 20080 | If one action leads to another, does it cause it, or is it part of it? [Stout,R] |
| 20059 | I do actions, but not events, so actions are not events [Stout,R] |
| 20081 | Bicycle riding is not just bodily movement - you also have to be on the bicycle [Stout,R] |
| 20044 | The rationalistic approach says actions are intentional when subject to justification [Stout,R] |
| 20039 | The causal theory says that actions are intentional when intention (or belief-desire) causes the act [Stout,R] |
| 20047 | Deciding what to do usually involves consulting the world, not our own minds [Stout,R] |
| 20065 | Should we study intentions in their own right, or only as part of intentional action? [Stout,R] |
| 20067 | You can have incompatible desires, but your intentions really ought to be consistent [Stout,R] |
| 20078 | The normativity of intentions would be obvious if they were internal promises [Stout,R] |
| 20036 | Intentional agency is seen in internal precursors of action, and in external reasons for the act [Stout,R] |
| 20066 | Speech needs sustained intentions, but not prior intentions [Stout,R] |
| 20073 | Bratman has to treat shared intentions as interrelated individual intentions [Stout,R] |
| 20069 | A request to pass the salt shares an intention that the request be passed on [Stout,R] |
| 20070 | An individual cannot express the intention that a group do something like moving a piano [Stout,R] |
| 20071 | An intention is a goal to which behaviour is adapted, for an individual or for a group [Stout,R] |
| 20038 | If the action of walking is just an act of will, then movement of the legs seems irrelevant [Stout,R] |
| 20050 | Most philosophers see causation as by an event or state in the agent, rather than the whole agent [Stout,R] |
| 20052 | If you don't mention an agent, you aren't talking about action [Stout,R] |
| 20077 | If you can judge one act as best, then do another, this supports an inward-looking view of agency [Stout,R] |
| 20049 | Maybe your emotions arise from you motivations, rather than being their cause [Stout,R] |
| 20046 | For an ascetic a powerful desire for something is a reason not to implement it [Stout,R] |
| 20060 | Beliefs, desires and intentions are not events, so can't figure in causal relations [Stout,R] |
| 20055 | A standard view says that the explanation of an action is showing its rational justification [Stout,R] |
| 20056 | In order to be causal, an agent's reasons must be internalised as psychological states [Stout,R] |
| 20053 | An action is only yours if you produce it, rather than some state or event within you [Stout,R] |
| 20048 | There may be a justification relative to a person's view, and yet no absolute justification [Stout,R] |
| 20068 | Describing a death as a side-effect rather than a goal may just be good public relations [Stout,R] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
| 20083 | Aristotelian causation involves potentiality inputs into processes (rather than a pair of events) [Stout,R] |