23 ideas
12177 | Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper] |
12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
23262 | Experience, sympathy and history are sensible grounds for laying claim to rights [Grayling] |
23263 | Politics is driven by power cliques [Grayling] |
23255 | It is essential for democracy that voting is free and well informed [Grayling] |
23254 | Democracies should require a supermajority for major questions [Grayling] |
23260 | A cap on time of service would restrict party control and career ambitions [Grayling] |
23253 | Majority decisions are only acceptable if the minority interests are not vital [Grayling] |
23256 | Liberty and equality cannot be reconciled [Grayling] |
23258 | The very concept of democracy entails a need for justice [Grayling] |
23259 | There should be separate legislative, executive and judicial institutions [Grayling] |
12175 | Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper] |
12179 | Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper] |