16 ideas
14380 | The distinction between necessary and essential properties can be ignored [Rocca] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
22262 | Kant's moral law has no foundation - because that would undermine its priority [Sandel] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
22264 | Modern liberal rights in democracies protect individuals against the majority [Sandel] |
22261 | Liberals say rights always come first, and justice is neutral on social values [Sandel] |
22263 | Liberal justice means the withdrawal of the self, as transcendental or as unencumbered [Sandel] |
22805 | Liberalism concerns rights, and communitarianism concerns the common good [Sandel, by Avineri/De-Shalit] |