Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Moral Thinking: Its Levels,Method and Point', 'In Defense of a Dogma' and 'Logical Atomism'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read]
To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell]
'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell]
Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
If we give up synonymy, we have to give up significance, meaning and sense [Grice/Strawson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare]