Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'Moral Relativism' and 'Modal Logic'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


20 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / b. System K
Normal system K has five axioms and rules [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
S4 has 14 modalities, and always reduces to a maximum of three modal operators [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
In S5 all the long complex modalities reduce to just three, and their negations [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
Reject the Barcan if quantifiers are confined to worlds, and different things exist in other worlds [Cresswell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc [Cresswell]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
A de dicto necessity is true in all worlds, but not necessarily of the same thing in each world [Cresswell]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
When we say 'is red' we don't mean 'seems red to most people' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
All people need affection, cooperation, community and help in trouble [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Do we have a concept of value, other than wanting something, or making an effort to get it? [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]