Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'Phaedo' and 'Introduction to the Theory of Logic'

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49 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom makes virtue and true goodness possible [Plato]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy is a purification of the soul ready for the afterlife [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
In investigation the body leads us astray, but the soul gets a clear view of the facts [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
The greatest misfortune for a person is to develop a dislike for argument [Plato]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Sets can be defined by 'enumeration', or by 'abstraction' (based on a property) [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
The 'Cartesian Product' of two sets relates them by pairing every element with every element [Zalabardo]
A 'partial ordering' is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Determinacy: an object is either in a set, or it isn't [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / l. Axiom of Specification
Specification: Determinate totals of objects always make a set [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
A first-order 'sentence' is a formula with no free variables [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Γ |= φ if φ is true when all of Γ is true, for all structures and interpretations [Zalabardo]
Γ |= φ for sentences if φ is true when all of Γ is true [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / b. Basic connectives
Propositional logic just needs ¬, and one of ∧, ∨ and → [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo]
We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logically true sentences are true in all structures [Zalabardo]
'Logically true' (|= φ) is true for every truth-assignment [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
Some formulas are 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and interpretation that makes them true [Zalabardo]
A sentence-set is 'satisfiable' if at least one truth-assignment makes them all true [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A structure models a sentence if it is true in the model, and a set of sentences if they are all true in the model [Zalabardo]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / f. Arithmetic
If you add one to one, which one becomes two, or do they both become two? [Plato]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
If a set is defined by induction, then proof by induction can be applied to it [Zalabardo]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
If Simmias is taller than Socrates, that isn't a feature that is just in Simmias [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
We must have a prior knowledge of equality, if we see 'equal' things and realise they fall short of it [Plato]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
There is only one source for all beauty [Plato]
Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The ship which Theseus took to Crete is now sent to Delos crowned with flowers [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / b. Recollection doctrine
If we feel the inadequacy of a resemblance, we must recollect the original [Plato]
People are obviously recollecting when they react to a geometrical diagram [Plato]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
To achieve pure knowledge, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things with the soul [Plato]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
To investigate the causes of things, study what is best for them [Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Do we think and experience with blood, air or fire, or could it be our brain? [Plato]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
One soul can't be more or less of a soul than another [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
It is a mistake to think that the most violent pleasure or pain is therefore the truest reality [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
War aims at the acquisition of wealth, because we are enslaved to the body [Plato]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Fancy being unable to distinguish a cause from its necessary background conditions! [Plato]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
If the Earth is spherical and in the centre, it is kept in place by universal symmetry, not by force [Plato]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Whether the soul pre-exists our body depends on whether it contains the ultimate standard of reality [Plato]