19 ideas
| 9978 | Analytic philosophy focuses too much on forms of expression, instead of what is actually said [Tait] |
| 9986 | The null set was doubted, because numbering seemed to require 'units' [Tait] |
| 9984 | We can have a series with identical members [Tait] |
| 19699 | A Gettier case is a belief which is true, and its fallible justification involves some luck [Hetherington] |
| 9981 | Abstraction is 'logical' if the sense and truth of the abstraction depend on the concrete [Tait] |
| 9982 | Cantor and Dedekind use abstraction to fix grammar and objects, not to carry out proofs [Tait] |
| 9985 | Abstraction may concern the individuation of the set itself, not its elements [Tait] |
| 9972 | Why should abstraction from two equipollent sets lead to the same set of 'pure units'? [Tait] |
| 9980 | If abstraction produces power sets, their identity should imply identity of the originals [Tait] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |