17 ideas
| 5062 | First: there must be reasons; Second: why anything at all?; Third: why this? [Leibniz] |
| 19377 | A monad and its body are living, so life is everywhere, and comes in infinite degrees [Leibniz] |
| 16620 | A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes] |
| 16622 | Essence is just an artificial word from logic, giving a way of thinking about substances [Hobbes] |
| 19353 | 'Perception' is basic internal representation, and 'apperception' is reflective knowledge of perception [Leibniz] |
| 5061 | Animals are semi-rational because they connect facts, but they don't see causes [Leibniz] |
| 5063 | Music charms, although its beauty is the harmony of numbers [Leibniz] |
| 2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
| 2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
| 2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
| 2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
| 2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
| 2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
| 2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
| 2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
| 2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
| 2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |