18 ideas
12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |