17 ideas
6211 | Laughter is a sudden glory in realising the infirmity of others, or our own formerly [Hobbes] |
21717 | Reducibility undermines type ramification, and is committed to the existence of functions [Quine, by Linsky,B] |
6213 | A man cannot will to will, or will to will to will, so the idea of a voluntary will is absurd [Hobbes] |
6208 | Conceptions and apparitions are just motion in some internal substance of the head [Hobbes] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
6209 | There is no absolute good, for even the goodness of God is goodness to us [Hobbes] |
6210 | Life has no end (not even happiness), because we have desires, which presuppose a further end [Hobbes] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
6212 | Lust involves pleasure, and also the sense of power in pleasing others [Hobbes] |