Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'The Pragmatist Account of Truth' and 'Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
22642 Man has an intense natural interest in the consistency of his own thinking [James]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
22641 Realities just are, and beliefs are true of them [James]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
22640 We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
3926 The human heart has a natural concern for public good [Hume]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
3929 No moral theory is of any use if it doesn't serve the interests of the individual concerned [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
3925 Personal Merit is the possession of useful or agreeable mental qualities [Hume]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
3922 Justice only exists to support society [Hume]
23560 If we all naturally had everything we could ever desire, the virtue of justice would be irrelevant [Hume]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
3918 Moral philosophy aims to show us our duty [Hume]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
3919 Conclusions of reason do not affect our emotions or decisions to act [Hume]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
3928 Virtue just requires careful calculation and a preference for the greater happiness [Hume]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
3923 No one would cause pain to a complete stranger who happened to be passing [Hume]
3924 Nature makes private affections come first, because public concerns are spread too thinly [Hume]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
3921 The safety of the people is the supreme law [Hume]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
3927 Society prefers helpful lies to harmful truth [Hume]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
3920 If you equalise possessions, people's talents will make them unequal again [Hume]