Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Universal Prescriptivism', 'Expositio super viii libros' and 'Without Immediate Justification'

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18 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
9089 Knowledge is a quality existing subjectively in the soul [William of Ockham]
9091 Sometimes 'knowledge' just concerns the conclusion, sometimes the whole demonstration [William of Ockham]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
9090 Knowledge is certain cognition of something that is true [William of Ockham]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8851 Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
8849 Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
8853 Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8855 Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
8852 In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]