15 ideas
15970 | People generalise because it is easier to understand, and that is mistaken for deep philosophy [Feynman] |
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |
10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
9410 | Physical Laws are rhythms and patterns in nature, revealed by analysis [Feynman] |
18530 | Nobody understands quantum mechanics [Feynman] |
17707 | We should regard space as made up of many tiny pieces [Feynman, by Mares] |