13 ideas
| 15970 | People generalise because it is easier to understand, and that is mistaken for deep philosophy [Feynman] |
| 9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
| 9465 | Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette] |
| 9466 | Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette] |
| 9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
| 9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
| 9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
| 9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
| 9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
| 9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
| 9410 | Physical Laws are rhythms and patterns in nature, revealed by analysis [Feynman] |
| 18530 | Nobody understands quantum mechanics [Feynman] |
| 17707 | We should regard space as made up of many tiny pieces [Feynman, by Mares] |