Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Character of Physical Law', 'Universals' and 'Comments on a Certain Broadsheet'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
People generalise because it is easier to understand, and that is mistaken for deep philosophy [Feynman]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard [Armstrong]
'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
'Predicate Nominalism' says that a 'universal' property is just a predicate applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
Concept and predicate nominalism miss out some predicates, and may be viciously regressive [Armstrong]
'Concept Nominalism' says a 'universal' property is just a mental concept applied to lots of things [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong]
'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong]
'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 6. Mereological Nominalism
'Mereological Nominalism' sees whiteness as a huge white object consisting of all the white things [Armstrong]
'Mereological Nominalism' may work for whiteness, but it doesn't seem to work for squareness [Armstrong]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes]
Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Physical Laws are rhythms and patterns in nature, revealed by analysis [Feynman]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Nobody understands quantum mechanics [Feynman]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
We should regard space as made up of many tiny pieces [Feynman, by Mares]