11 ideas
| 15970 | People generalise because it is easier to understand, and that is mistaken for deep philosophy [Feynman] |
| 7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle] |
| 7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle] |
| 7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle] |
| 7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle] |
| 7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle] |
| 14288 | 'If A,B' affirms that A⊃B, and also that this wouldn't change if A were certain [Jackson, by Edgington] |
| 13769 | Conditionals are truth-functional, but should only be asserted when they are confident [Jackson, by Edgington] |
| 9410 | Physical Laws are rhythms and patterns in nature, revealed by analysis [Feynman] |
| 18530 | Nobody understands quantum mechanics [Feynman] |
| 17707 | We should regard space as made up of many tiny pieces [Feynman, by Mares] |