Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Character of Physical Law', 'Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology' and 'The Essence of Reference'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
15970 People generalise because it is easier to understand, and that is mistaken for deep philosophy [Feynman]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18877 Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18868 Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18867 Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron]
18873 God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18879 What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
18880 Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
18874 Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
18869 Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18871 I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron]
18870 Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
10429 It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
10425 Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury]
10438 Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
18881 For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]
18875 Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]
18878 Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
18872 We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
10432 A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
10434 Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 3. Natural Function
10431 Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
9410 Physical Laws are rhythms and patterns in nature, revealed by analysis [Feynman]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
18530 Nobody understands quantum mechanics [Feynman]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
17707 We should regard space as made up of many tiny pieces [Feynman, by Mares]