Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Character of Physical Law', 'Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness'' and 'Russell's Metaphysical Logic'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
15970 People generalise because it is easier to understand, and that is mistaken for deep philosophy [Feynman]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
21704 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
21705 Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
21727 Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
21719 Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
21723 The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
21721 Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B]
21703 Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B]
21714 The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
21713 Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B]
21715 For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
21729 Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
9312 Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
9313 Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
9315 Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
9316 How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
9314 Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
9410 Physical Laws are rhythms and patterns in nature, revealed by analysis [Feynman]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
18530 Nobody understands quantum mechanics [Feynman]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
17707 We should regard space as made up of many tiny pieces [Feynman, by Mares]