36 ideas
12104 | All ideas must be understood historically [Comte] |
12105 | Our knowledge starts in theology, passes through metaphysics, and ends in positivism [Comte] |
12112 | Metaphysics is just the oversubtle qualification of abstract names for phenomena [Comte] |
2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
12106 | Positivism gives up absolute truth, and seeks phenomenal laws, by reason and observation [Comte] |
12111 | Positivism is the final state of human intelligence [Comte] |
12114 | Science can drown in detail, so we need broad scientists (to keep out the metaphysicians) [Comte] |
12116 | Only positivist philosophy can terminate modern social crises [Comte] |
2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
23551 | It is necessary for a belief that it be held for a length of time [Fricker,M] |
12108 | All real knowledge rests on observed facts [Comte] |
23558 | Offering knowledge needs accuracy and sincerity; receiving it needs testimonial justice [Fricker,M] |
2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
23550 | Burge says we are normally a priori entitled to believe testimony [Fricker,M] |
23552 | We assess testimonial probabilities by the speaker, the listener, the facts, and the circumstances [Fricker,M] |
23553 | Testimonial judgement is not logical, but produces reasons and motivations [Fricker,M] |
23555 | Assessing credibility involves the impact of both the speaker's and the listener's social identity [Fricker,M] |
6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
12109 | We must observe in order to form theories, but connected observations need prior theories [Comte] |
12107 | Positivism explains facts by connecting particular phenomena with general facts [Comte] |
2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
12115 | Introspection is pure illusion; we can obviously observe everything except ourselves [Comte] |
23554 | Judgements can be unreflective and non-inferential, yet rational, by being sensitive to experience [Fricker,M] |
2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
23557 | To judge agents in remote times and cultures we need a moral resentment weaker than blame [Fricker,M] |
2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |
12113 | The search for first or final causes is futile [Comte] |
12110 | We can never know origins, purposes or inner natures [Comte] |