Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature', 'Naturalizing the Mind' and 'Lewis on Perdurance versus Endurance'

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
2557 Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
2556 Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
4726 Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
2549 For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15541 Maybe particles are unchanging, and intrinsic change in things is their rearrangement [Lowe, by Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
5806 Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
5801 A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
2548 If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
6599 Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
2566 You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
2553 The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
2550 Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
5802 Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
5809 Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
2554 Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5808 Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5803 In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
5807 Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
5805 Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
5804 A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
5800 All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
2565 Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
2560 Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
2562 A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
2559 Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
2558 Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty]