29 ideas
2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
7740 | There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner] |
2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
19466 | The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege] |
4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
19465 | There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege] |
2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
19468 | The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege] |
19470 | Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege] |
19471 | A fact is a thought that is true [Frege] |
9877 | Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett] |
8970 | Our notion of identical sets involves identical members, which needs absolute identity [Hawthorne] |
2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
19469 | We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege] |
8162 | Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett] |
9818 | A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett] |
16379 | Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege] |
2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
19467 | A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege] |
19472 | A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege] |
2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |