Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature', 'Aristotle on Substance' and 'An Outline of Philosophy'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 3. Matter of an Object
Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object [Gill,ML]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / d. Reform of offenders
Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / b. Prime matter
Prime matter has no place in Aristotle's theories, and passages claiming it are misread [Gill,ML]
Prime matter is actually nothing and potentially everything (or potentially an element) [Gill,ML]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon]