35 ideas
| 2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
| 2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
| 4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
| 2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
| 13733 | Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 9874 | Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
| 18252 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege] |
| 18271 | We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege] |
| 10623 | Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
| 9975 | Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege] |
| 18165 | My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege] |
| 2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
| 6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
| 2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
| 2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
| 2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
| 2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
| 9190 | A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 13665 | Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
| 2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
| 2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
| 2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
| 23814 | Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil] |
| 23824 | Where human needs are satisfied we find happiness, friendship and beauty [Weil] |
| 23815 | We cannot equally respect what is unequal, so equal respect needs a shared ground [Weil] |
| 23823 | Life needs risks to avoid sickly boredom [Weil] |
| 2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |
| 23822 | We all need to partipate in public tasks, and take some initiative [Weil] |
| 23817 | We need both equality (to attend to human needs) and hierarchy (as a scale of responsibilities) [Weil] |
| 23819 | Deliberate public lying should be punished [Weil] |
| 23818 | We have liberty in the space between nature and accepted authority [Weil] |
| 23820 | People need personal and collective property, and a social class lacking property is shameful [Weil] |
| 23821 | Crime should be punished, to bring the perpetrator freely back to morality [Weil] |
| 23816 | Attention to a transcendent reality motivates a duty to foster the good of humanity [Weil] |