Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Leibniz', 'The Concept of a Person' and 'Mathematical Truth'

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12 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
9935 Mathematical truth is always compromising between ordinary language and sensible epistemology [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
17927 Realists have semantics without epistemology, anti-realists epistemology but bad semantics [Benacerraf, by Colyvan]
9936 The platonist view of mathematics doesn't fit our epistemology very well [Benacerraf]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
19378 Early modern possibility is what occurs sometime; for Leibniz, it is what is not contradictory [Arthur,R]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
5662 Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
5664 Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 7. Self and Body / a. Self needs body
5668 People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
5661 We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
5665 Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer]
5666 Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 6. Body sustains Self
5669 Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
19380 Occasionalism contradicts the Eucharist, which needs genuine changes of substance [Arthur,R]