35 ideas
| 16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
| 16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
| 16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
| 3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
| 16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
| 16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
| 16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
| 16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
| 16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
| 16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
| 16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
| 16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
| 8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
| 16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
| 3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
| 3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
| 3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
| 3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
| 3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
| 3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
| 16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
| 3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |
| 5078 | Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R] |
| 5067 | Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R] |
| 5079 | Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R] |
| 5068 | 'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R] |
| 5076 | To Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function [Taylor,R] |
| 5077 | The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R] |
| 5066 | If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R] |
| 5065 | The ethics of duty requires a religious framework [Taylor,R] |
| 7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
| 16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
| 16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
| 16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
| 16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |