Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Hobbes', 'Russell's Metaphysical Logic' and 'My Philosophical Development'

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35 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
6420 Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell]
6432 Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
21704 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
6437 The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
6442 Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
21705 Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
6436 I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
7528 Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
6439 Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
21727 Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
21719 Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
6423 We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell]
21723 The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
21721 Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B]
21703 Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B]
21714 The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
21713 Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B]
21715 For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
6424 Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell]
6425 Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
6426 Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
6419 In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell]
6438 Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
6434 Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
21729 Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
6440 Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
6430 In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
6441 Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
6431 Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
6444 True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
7413 Without confidence in our beliefs, how should we actually live? [Tuck]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
6433 Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
6443 Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
6427 Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
6435 You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]