11 ideas
7413 | Without confidence in our beliefs, how should we actually live? [Tuck] |
5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
7522 | A full neural account of qualia will give new epistemic access to them, beyond private experience [Churchlands] |
7521 | It is question-begging to assume that qualia are totally simple, hence irreducible [Churchlands] |
7523 | The qualia Hard Problem is easy, in comparison with the co-ordination of mental states [Churchlands] |
5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |