Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Hobbes', 'Beginning Logic' and 'On the Nature of the Universe'

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95 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
'Contradictory' propositions always differ in truth-value [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
That proposition that both P and Q is their 'conjunction', written P∧Q [Lemmon]
The sign |- may be read as 'therefore' [Lemmon]
If A and B are 'interderivable' from one another we may write A -||- B [Lemmon]
We write the conditional 'if P (antecedent) then Q (consequent)' as P→Q [Lemmon]
We write the 'negation' of P (not-P) as ¬ [Lemmon]
That proposition that either P or Q is their 'disjunction', written P∨Q [Lemmon]
We write 'P if and only if Q' as P↔Q; it is also P iff Q, or (P→Q)∧(Q→P) [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
A 'well-formed formula' follows the rules for variables, ¬, →, ∧, ∨, and ↔ [Lemmon]
A 'substitution-instance' is a wff formed by consistent replacing variables with wffs [Lemmon]
A wff is 'inconsistent' if all assignments to variables result in the value F [Lemmon]
Two propositions are 'equivalent' if they mirror one another's truth-value [Lemmon]
'Subcontrary' propositions are never both false, so that A∨B is a tautology [Lemmon]
'Contrary' propositions are never both true, so that ¬(A∧B) is a tautology [Lemmon]
A wff is a 'tautology' if all assignments to variables result in the value T [Lemmon]
A wff is 'contingent' if produces at least one T and at least one F [Lemmon]
A 'theorem' is the conclusion of a provable sequent with zero assumptions [Lemmon]
A 'implies' B if B is true whenever A is true (so that A→B is tautologous) [Lemmon]
The 'scope' of a connective is the connective, the linked formulae, and the brackets [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
DN: Given A, we may derive ¬¬A [Lemmon]
∧I: Given A and B, we may derive A∧B [Lemmon]
MPP: Given A and A→B, we may derive B [Lemmon]
∧E: Given A∧B, we may derive either A or B separately [Lemmon]
∨E: Derive C from A∨B, if C can be derived both from A and from B [Lemmon]
MTT: Given ¬B and A→B, we derive ¬A [Lemmon]
A: we may assume any proposition at any stage [Lemmon]
∨I: Given either A or B separately, we may derive A∨B [Lemmon]
RAA: If assuming A will prove B∧¬B, then derive ¬A [Lemmon]
CP: Given a proof of B from A as assumption, we may derive A→B [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
'Modus ponendo tollens' (MPT) says P, ¬(P ∧ Q) |- ¬Q [Lemmon]
We can change conjunctions into negated conditionals with P→Q -||- ¬(P → ¬Q) [Lemmon]
The Distributive Laws can rearrange a pair of conjunctions or disjunctions [Lemmon]
De Morgan's Laws make negated conjunctions/disjunctions into non-negated disjunctions/conjunctions [Lemmon]
We can change conditionals into disjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬P ∨ Q [Lemmon]
We can change conditionals into negated conjunctions with P→Q -||- ¬(P ∧ ¬Q) [Lemmon]
'Modus tollendo ponens' (MTP) says ¬P, P ∨ Q |- Q [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Truth-tables are good for showing invalidity [Lemmon]
A truth-table test is entirely mechanical, but this won't work for more complex logic [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 4. Soundness of PL
If any of the nine rules of propositional logic are applied to tautologies, the result is a tautology [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 5. Completeness of PL
Propositional logic is complete, since all of its tautologous sequents are derivable [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / a. Symbols of PC
Write '(∀x)(...)' to mean 'take any x: then...', and '(∃x)(...)' to mean 'there is an x such that....' [Lemmon]
'Gm' says m has property G, and 'Pmn' says m has relation P to n [Lemmon]
The 'symbols' are bracket, connective, term, variable, predicate letter, reverse-E [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / b. Terminology of PC
Our notation uses 'predicate-letters' (for 'properties'), 'variables', 'proper names', 'connectives' and 'quantifiers' [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / c. Derivations rules of PC
Universal Elimination (UE) lets us infer that an object has F, from all things having F [Lemmon]
Predicate logic uses propositional connectives and variables, plus new introduction and elimination rules [Lemmon]
Universal elimination if you start with the universal, introduction if you want to end with it [Lemmon]
With finite named objects, we can generalise with &-Intro, but otherwise we need ∀-Intro [Lemmon]
UE all-to-one; UI one-to-all; EI arbitrary-to-one; EE proof-to-one [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / d. Universal quantifier ∀
If there is a finite domain and all objects have names, complex conjunctions can replace universal quantifiers [Lemmon]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
'Some Frenchmen are generous' is rendered by (∃x)(Fx→Gx), and not with the conditional → [Lemmon]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
The paradoxes of material implication are P |- Q → P, and ¬P |- P → Q [Lemmon]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius]
If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Without confidence in our beliefs, how should we actually live? [Tuck]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius]
The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius]
Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius]
Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius]
The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius]
If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius]
In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Atoms move themselves [Lucretius]
If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Spirit is mortal [Lucretius]
For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius]
An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius]
If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius]