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All the ideas for 'Hobbes', 'Summa Theologicae' and 'Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects'

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98 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Supposing many principles is superfluous if a few will do it [Aquinas]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth is universal, but knowledge of it is not [Aquinas]
Types of lying: Speak lies, intend lies, intend deception, aim at deceptive goal? [Aquinas, by Tuckness/Wolf]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 9. Rejecting Truth
If the existence of truth is denied, the 'Truth does not exist' must be true! [Aquinas]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
If a syllogism admits one absurdity, others must follow [Aquinas]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck]
There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C]
Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C]
What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend]
Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck]
It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C]
The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C]
Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C]
The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / g. Particular being
Being implies distinctness, which implies division, unity, and multitude [Aquinas]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 5. Naturalism
Non-human things are explicable naturally, and voluntary things by the will, so God is not needed [Aquinas]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
Humans only have a single substantial form, which contains the others and acts for them [Aquinas]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
The conclusions of speculative reason about necessities are certain [Aquinas]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
A knowing being possesses a further reality, the 'presence' of the thing known [Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Some things are self-evident to us; others are only self-evident in themselves [Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
A proposition is self-evident if the predicate is included in the essence of the subject [Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Sensation prepares the way for intellectual knowledge, which needs the virtues of reason [Aquinas]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Without confidence in our beliefs, how should we actually live? [Tuck]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Sensations are transmitted to 'internal senses' in the brain, chiefly to 'phantasia' and 'imagination' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
Mental activity combines what we sense with imagination of what is not present [Aquinas]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Abstracting A from B generates truth, as long as the connection is not denied [Aquinas]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
We understand the general nature of things by ignoring individual peculiarities [Aquinas]
The mind abstracts generalities from images, but also uses images for understanding [Aquinas]
Very general ideas (being, oneness, potentiality) can be abstracted from thought matter in general [Aquinas]
Particular instances come first, and (pace Plato) generalisations are abstracted from them [Aquinas]
Species are abstracted from appearances by ignoring individual conditions [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Aquinas attributes freedom to decisions and judgements, and not to the will alone [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
The human intellectual soul is an incorporeal, subsistent principle [Aquinas]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
First grasp what it is, then its essential features; judgement is their compounding and division [Aquinas]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C]
'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
We abstract forms from appearances, and acquire knowledge of immaterial things [Aquinas]
Understanding consists entirely of grasping abstracted species [Aquinas]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Mathematics can be abstracted from sensible matter, and from individual intelligible matter [Aquinas]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Mathematical objects abstract both from perceived matter, and from particular substance [Aquinas]
We can just think of an apple's colour, because the apple is not part of the colour's nature [Aquinas]
Abstracting either treats something as separate, or thinks of it separately [Aquinas]
Numbers and shapes are abstracted by ignoring their sensible qualities [Aquinas]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
The mind must produce by its own power an image of the individual species [Aquinas]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will is the rational appetite [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
For humans good is accordance with reason, and bad is contrary to reason [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / e. Means and ends
We must know the end, know that it is the end, and know how to attain it [Aquinas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
All acts of virtue relate to justice, which is directed towards the common good [Aquinas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Aquinas wanted, not to escape desire, but to transform it for moral ends [Aquinas, by MacIntyre]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
Legal justice is supreme, because it directs the other virtues to the common good [Aquinas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Temperance prevents our passions from acting against reason [Aquinas]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice directs our relations with others, because it denotes a kind of equality [Aquinas]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
People differ in their social degrees, and a particular type of right applies to each [Aquinas]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / c. Natural law
Natural law is a rational creature's participation in eternal law [Aquinas]
Tyrannical laws are irrational, and so not really laws [Aquinas]
Right and wrong actions pertain to natural law, as perceived by practical reason [Aquinas]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
For Aquinas a war must be in a just cause, have proper authority, and aim at good [Aquinas, by Grayling]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Aquinas says a fertilized egg is not human, and has no immortal soul [Aquinas, by Martin/Barresi]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Bodies are three-dimensional substances [Aquinas]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
Divine law commands some things because they are good, while others are good because commanded [Aquinas]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
We can't know God's essence, so his existence can't be self-evident for us [Aquinas]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
If you assume that there must be a necessary being, you can't say which being has this quality [Kant on Aquinas]
Way 1: the infinite chain of potential-to-actual movement has to have a first mover [Aquinas]
Way 2: no effect without a cause, and this cannot go back to infinity, so there is First Cause [Aquinas]
Way 3: contingent beings eventually vanish, so continuity needs a necessary being [Aquinas]
Way 4: the source of all qualities is their maximum, so something (God) causes all perfections [Aquinas]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
Way 5: mindless things act towards an obvious end, so there is an intelligent director [Aquinas]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Life aims at the Beatific Vision - of perfect happiness, and revealed truth [Aquinas, by Zagzebski]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / c. Angels
Aquinas saw angels as separated forms, rather than as made of 'spiritual matter' [Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Humans have a non-physical faculty of reason, so they can be immortal [Aquinas, by Sorabji]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
Those in bliss have their happiness increased by seeing the damned punished [Aquinas]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
God does not exist, because He is infinite and good, and so no evil should be discoverable [Aquinas]
It is part of God's supreme goodness that He brings good even out of evil [Aquinas]