Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mapping the Mind', 'The Empirical Stance' and 'What is a Law of Nature?'

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60 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Philosophy is a value- and attitude-driven enterprise [Fraassen]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Is it likely that a successful, coherent, explanatory ontological hypothesis is true? [Fraassen]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analytic philosophy has an exceptional arsenal of critical tools [Fraassen]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
We may end up with a huge theory of carefully constructed falsehoods [Fraassen]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 2. Categorisation
Brain lesions can erase whole categories of perception, suggesting they are hard-wired [Carter,R]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 7. Against Powers
If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong]
Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong]
Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong]
Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis]
Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / b. Individuation by properties
It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Sense organs don't discriminate; they reduce various inputs to the same electrical pulses [Carter,R]
The recognition sequence is: classify, name, locate, associate, feel [Carter,R, by PG]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
There seems to be no dividing line between a memory and a thought [Carter,R]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong]
Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
Inference to best explanation contains all sorts of hidden values [Fraassen]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
We accept many scientific theories without endorsing them as true [Fraassen]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
No one knows if animals are conscious [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 8. Brain
Pain doesn't have one brain location, but is linked to attention and emotion [Carter,R]
Proper brains appear at seven weeks, and neonates have as many neurons as adults do [Carter,R]
In primates, brain size correlates closely with size of social group [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / c. Parts of consciousness
Consciousness involves awareness, perception, self-awareness, attention and reflection [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
There is enormous evidence that consciousness arises in the frontal lobes of the brain [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
Normal babies seem to have overlapping sense experiences [Carter,R]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 7. Blindsight
In blindsight V1 (normal vision) is inactive, but V5 (movement) lights up [Carter,R]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
Out-of-body experiences may be due to temporary loss of proprioception [Carter,R]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Scans of brains doing similar tasks produce very similar patterns of activation [Carter,R]
Thinking takes place on the upper side of the prefrontal cortex [Carter,R]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
Babies show highly emotional brain events, but may well be unaware of them [Carter,R]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
The only way we can control our emotions is by manipulating the outside world that influences them [Carter,R]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
A frog will starve to death surrounded by dead flies [Carter,R]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
The 'locus coeruleus' is one of several candidates for the brain's 'pleasure centre' [Carter,R]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong]
Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis]
A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong]
Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong]
Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong]